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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the unlimited deposit insurance on non-
performing loans and market discipline. Deposit insurance program play a crucial role in 
achieving financial stability. Governments in many advanced and developing economies 
established deposit insurance schemes for reducing the risk of systemic failure of banks. Deposit 
insurance has a beneficial effect of reducing the probability of a bank run.  However deposit 
insurance systems have its own set of problems. Deposit insurance systems create moral hazard 
incentives that encourage banks to take excessive risk. Turkey established an explicit deposit 
insurance system in 1960. Until 1994, the coverage determined by a flat rate but in that date, 
Turkey experienced a major economic crisis. In April 1994, Turkish government started to apply 
an unlimited deposit insurance scheme to restore banking system stability. Unlimited deposit 
insurance caused a remarkable increase at non-performing loans. This paper empirically 
estimates the impact of unlimited deposit insurance system on non-performing bank loans (NPLs) 
and analyses the other potential sources of NPLs .  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
inancial crises became a serious threat for the world economy especially after the financial 
deregulation process of the 1980s. This process and increased competition affected banking system 
safety and soundness therefore banking system vulnerability increased during last decades. It is 
agreed that a stable macroeconomic environment is not sufficient for achieving high and sustained growth, 
macroeconomic stability needs to be complemented and strengthened by the development of a strong financial 
sector. The relationship between financial sector and real sector makes the intermediation efficiency, the indicator of 
capital accumulation and productive efficiency. Therefore the stability of financial system is very important to 
economic growth. After the banking deregulation process in 1980’s, international over-borrowing syndrome became 
an important threat for the banking systems of developing countries. In this process, the banking sectors in 
developing countries faced with the default risk because of inefficient portfolios, specifically, in terms of 
international funds. Over-borrowing problem follows a cyclical pattern in the recovery phase of business cycle. 
Increased demand leads prices to rise and attracts new investment. In a feedback relationship the new investments 
stimulates income.  
 
Minsky (1977) focused on over-investment and over-lending problems in order to explain financial crises 
and call this phenomenon “euphoria”. Following Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1989), the over-borrowing 
problem was modelled by McKinnon and Phil (1996). Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998) emphasized the role of 
implicit and explicit bail out guarantees on moral hazard problem. Under these guarantees, banks take excessive 
risk. Over-lending problem occurs through insufficient monetary capacity, asymmetric information and deposit 
insurance scheme. Current studies conclude that over-borrowing and bailout guarantees can cause severe currency 
and banking crises (twin crises). These models are called third generation models in currency crisis literature.  
 
F 
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In emerging markets, open economy conditions may cause banks to become vulnerable to exchange rate 
fluctuations under international over-borrowing. But there are also some other risks, which are stimulated by this 
problem, such as interest rate and credit risks. If banks switch these international funds in order to finance budget 
deficits by holding government bonds in their portfolios, interest rate risk would increase. But if moral hazard leads 
banks to take unhedged foreign exchange position in order to fulfill the domestic over-borrowing demands by the 
upswing of the business cycle, this would increase credit risk. Deposit insurance also has played a crucial role in this 
process, because the banks may implicitly transfer most of the risk to the government through the deposit insurance 
scheme.  
 
Banks are profit maximizing institutions but the risks that they face are quite different from non-financial 
institutions and subject to several kinds of specific risk such as liquidity, credit risk and interest rate risk. A failure 
of a bank changes the expectations of bank depositors and investors. A sudden change of the expectations in the 
same direction can lead systemic problems without government intervention. This process usually ends with a 
banking crisis. Central banks and supervisory authorities need to always be prepared to respond effectively to bank 
distress and failure, to minimize contagion risk and restore investor confidence in the financial system. 
 
Deposit insurance is an effective way to prevent financial instability. A well constructed deposit insurance 
system is important for smooth functioning of the payments system and credit allocation mechanism. Deposit 
insurance systems protect the less sophisticated depositors and help to prevent bank runs. On the other hand, deposit 
insurance schemes are not costless. Deposit insurance not only increases stability of banking system by protecting 
depositors, but also stimulates the moral hazard problem of insured banks. Without depositors monitoring, deposits 
shift to unsound banks. The shift of funds into high risk projects can lead to less productive use of society’s limited 
resources. Therefore, achieving financial stability has been expensive involving wealth transfer at spectacular 
dimension. The coverage of deposit insurance is also very important. Under an unlimited deposit insurance scheme 
these negative effects can be strong. 
 
The paper is organized into four sections: Section 1 summarizes the history and the current situation of 
deposit insurance systems, section 2 discusses the Turkish deposit insurance scheme, section 3 empirically analyses 
the behavior and the sources non-performing loans and section 4 presents conclusions. 
 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS AND MORAL HAZARD 
 
Every developed country has a deposit insurance system; but as Schuler (1989) mentions, in all except the 
United States, deposit insurance is a recent innovation dating from the 1960s and 1970s.  New York State started to 
implement the first deposit insurance scheme in 1829. Six states before and eight states after the civil war had 
adapted deposit insurance. Until 1930s there was a very little support for nationwide deposit insurance system, but 
US suffered severe banking system problems especially between 1929 and 1933. Therefore, the United States 
pioneered modern-day deposit insurance systems. The national banking act of 1933 created the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The act also gave FDIC regularity and supervision functions. FDIC’s deposit 
insurance coverage initially set as at $2500 then rose in the same year to $5000. Today FDIC provides explicit 
coverage up to $100000 since 1980. FDIC charged a flat rate deposit insurance premiums until 1993 and in 1993 
began to implicate a risk based premiums pricing. 
 
After deposit insurance systems, financial distresses are no longer characterized by bank runs, but there is a 
trade off between preventing a crisis and creating moral hazard. With or without deposit insurance systems, bank 
owners and managers have incentives to take risks, but deposit insurance stimulates these risks because of the 
insufficient depositor monitoring. Insured depositors are indifferent the risks taken by their banks. These behaviors 
of depositors and bank owners weaken market discipline. Therefore, under deposit insurance systems regulators 
should fill this gap by effective regulation and supervision. Governments have to limit moral hazard without losing 
the benefits of deposit insurance. According to Lawrence, Goldberg and Harikumar (1991), perfect monitoring or 
risk based deposit premiums can eliminate moral hazard problem if information were symmetric between bank 
managers and the insurance company. Therefore, regulation plays a more important role under deposit insurance 
systems.  
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Another important factor which affects the depositor’s monitoring incentives is the coverage limit of 
deposit insurance system. A study group was created for working on deposit insurance systems at financial stability 
forum in November 1999 (G-7 finance ministers and Central Bank governors convened to promote international 
financial stability). According to group’s report (Financial Stability Forum, 2001), a credible limited-coverage 
deposit insurance system should be established in order to achieve financial stability. 
 
The objective of an effective deposit insurance scheme is to protect small depositors. There are only five 
countries which have unlimited deposit insurance systems in the world (Turkey, Mexico, Japan, South Korea and 
Ecuador).  
 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM IN TURKEY 
 
Recent years have witnessed a remarkable change in banking sector in Turkey. Currently, there are 47 
banks registered in Turkey. In the beginning of 2000, there were 79 banks in the system. Therefore 32 banks became 
insolvent during the stabilization program which began in January 2000. Asset sizes of currently operating banks 
were shown in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1: Asset Sizes and Banks 
 
Billion Dollar 0-1 1-2 2-5 5-10 10-20 20+ 
       
Commercial Banks 14 5 2 5 2 6 
   State Owned Banks 0 0 0 0 0 3 
   Private Banks 4 4 2 3 2 3 
   Foreign Banks 10 1 0 2 0 0 
Investment Banks 10 0 3 0 0 0 
Sectors    24 5 5 5 2 6 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey, 2005. 
 
 
Table 2 shows the asset sizes and market shares of commercial banks and other financial institutions. 
 
 
Table 2: Market Shares (%) 
 
 Total Assets Total Deposits Total Credits 
 90 99 06 90 99 06 90 99 06 
          
Commercial Banks 91 95 97 100 100 100 88 90 95 
   State Owned Banks 45 35 32 49 40 38 45 28 21 
   Private Banks 43 55 60 49 57 57 40 59 67 
   Foreign Banks 3 5 5 2 3 5 3 3 7 
Investment Banks 9 5 3 - - 0 12 10 5 
Sectors    100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey, 2005. 
 
 
Turkish deposit insurance system was established in 1960. The insurance was unlimited at the beginning 
but coverage became limited in 1983 (TL 3 Million). This coverage is expanded to TL 65 Million in 1992. In 1980s, 
Turkish financial system had been liberalized, but this process was not accompanied by modernization of the 
supervision and regulatory framework. On the other hand, government tried to stimulate short term capital inflows 
and effective demand by suppressing the exchange rate between 1989 and 1994. This process caused a large trade 
deficit which was unsustainable. In the beginning of the 1994, after a speculative attack exchange rates were allowed 
to float freely. 
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Banks were vulnerable to fluctuations in the exchange rates because of their huge short positions. Thus 
Turkey faced currency crisis and banking crisis at the same time. Three banks
1
 became insolvent. Total deposit share 
of these banks was 5.75 percent in 1994. During March, total deposits come down by 12 percent relative to the 
month before and in April 5, government announced a series of fiscal and financial measures, but the recovery of 
confidence only began when government announced that they started to implement a full coverage deposit insurance 
scheme. Former deposit insurance system wasn’t abolished, only became unlimited. 
 
This new legal framework of deposit insurance made it possible to decrease monitoring costs of banks, 
because moral hazard risk became less important for depositors since full coverage exists. Thus, new deposit scheme 
made matters worse and Turkish banking system suffered from serious problems with non-performing loans. 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
Shiers’ study (Shiers, 1994) is one of the few that attempts to look directly at the relationship between the 
level of deposit insurance coverage and bank risks. Defining bank risk as the coefficient of variation of return on 
assets and using a one equation OLS model, he found a positive and significant relationship (Karels, 1998), but in 
this study it has been used chow-test to analyze the impact of the deposit insurance coverage on non-performing 
loans.  
 
After analyzing the existence of a structural breakpoint we will estimate the determinants of non-
performing loans for the period after breakpoint using OLS. The existence of a threshold in 1994 can be considered 
as an evidence of the relationship between the insurance coverage and moral hazard. To examine this relationship, 
monthly data for the period 1987:1 to 2002:1 are used. The monthly data were obtained consolidated balance sheet 
tables of Turkish Banking System which published by Turkish Republic Central Bank regularly. 
 
The existence of a structural change was analyzed using the equations as follows: 
 
i00i tαα)Ln(NPL          3:19941:1987i   (1) 
 
i00i tββ)Ln(NPL           1:20024:1994i     (2) 
 
NPL: Non-performing Loans 
 
t: Time 
 
The chow test is statistically significant (F-value:407,164 and p-value :0). These results show that there is a 
strong structural change in non-performing loans. Besides these results, Graph 1 can be considered as an evidence of 
structural change. 
 
Graph 1: Breakpoint in 1994 
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1 Impexbank, TYT Bank and Marmara Bank. 
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In order to understand which variable determine this accelerating pattern of NPLs through unlimited 
deposit insurance we will use OLS estimation method. To emphasize directly the impact of unlimited deposit 
insurance scheme the data for the period 1994:4 2006:10 are used. 
 
 
Table 3: ADF Unit Root Test Statistics 
 
Variable Level Log Difference 
NPL  -1.73 -3.97
*** 
DEP      -4.13
*** -5.18*** 
CAP   -2.58
* -4.51*** 
CBL      -4.25
*** -5.26*** 
FB     -3.16
** -5.66*** 
DB  -1.71                           -5.29
*** 
Note: Superscripts *.**. ***. denote statistical significance at %10, %5 and %1 levels respectively. 
 
 
Analyzing Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test statistics indicate that (Table 3) model specification 
should be as in equation 3; 
  
  DBFBCBLCAPDEPLnNPL 543210  (3) 
 
Where NPL is non-performing loans, DEP is deposits, CAP is share of capital in total assets, CBL is funds 
required from Turkish Republic Central Bank, FB is foreign borrowing, DB is domestic borrowing.   
 
 
Table 4: Determinants of NPL: OLS Estimates. Standard Errors in Parenthesis 
 
Explanatory Variables NPL- Dependent Variable 
DEP 
1.61* 
(0.15) 
CAP 
0.61 
(0.15) 
CBL 
1.25 
(0.06) 
FB 
-2.67*** 
(0.06) 
DB 
-0.28 
(0.11) 
Constant 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
R squared 0.127 
Number of observations 148 
Note: Significance at 10 percent and 1 percent level is indicated by *, *** respectively 
 
 
OLS estimates indicate that unlimited deposit insurance system of Turkey triggered NPLs by damaging 
efficiency of allocation of deposits. With this new legal framework of deposit insurance, insolvency risk of a bank 
became less important for depositors since full coverage exists. Therefore, this process damaged also credit 
allocation mechanism and increased NPLs. As McKinnon and Phil (1996); Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998) 
emphasizes, the role of implicit and explicit bail out guarantees on moral hazard problem. Under these guarantees, 
banks take excessive risk. Over-lending problem occurs through insufficient monetary capacity, asymmetric 
information and deposit insurance scheme. These studies conclude that over-borrowing and bailout guarantees can 
cause severe currency and banking crises (twin crises). OLS results shows that, depositors decision are very 
important in this process and unlimited deposit insurance system affects these decision in a bad manner. It is a well 
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known fact that foreign financial institutions monitoring and screening banks efficiently after lending them. 
According to OLS results, it can be concluded that, borrowing from foreign financial institutions decreases NPLs.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper investigated the impact of unlimited deposit insurance on non-performing loans. Due to a 
financial crisis in 1994 government started to implement a full coverage deposit insurance scheme in Turkey. The 
new legal framework of deposit insurance made it possible to decrease monitoring costs of banks, because moral 
hazard risk became less important since full coverage exists. This situation caused a remarkable increase in non-
performing loans.  
 
Chow test results indicate that there is a strong structural change in non-performing loans in 1994. OLS 
estimates indicate that unlimited deposit insurance system of Turkey triggered NPLs by damaging efficiency of 
allocation of deposits. With this new legal framework of deposit insurance, insolvency risk of a bank became less 
important for depositors since full coverage exists.  
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